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IN niE SUPREME COURT 
of the , 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAMAS STATE BANK, 
A Utah Corporation, 
Respondent and Plaintiff, 
- VS -
J. BUYS CUMMINGS and 











Appellants and Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ca8e No. 
9798 
On or about the second day of January, 
1959, J. Buys Cummings petitioned the Dis-
trict Court of the Fourth Judicial Di8trict 
in and for Wasatch County for Letters of 
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Adainiatration in the Estate of joseph 
W. Cwlaings and Mary Ann CUIUliqs, his 
deceued father and 110ther. Thereafter 
J. Baya eu .. iaga was duly appointed M-
ainistrator of said estate. 
The asaets of the estate consisted 
entirely of the real property described 
in the pleadings in this case. 
The heirs of the Bstates of joseph 
W. Cummings and Mary Ann Cummings, de-
ceased, were: 
J. Buys Cu.nings 
Wallace E. Cummings 
William M. Cummings 
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3 
At the time of his death joseph W. 
Cummings had encumbered the aforementioned 
land with a welfare lien in the amount of 
One Thouatnd Bight Hundred Dollars ($1800.00) 
On the 30th day of April, 1958, Marion G. 
Pletcher and Nola Pletcher, his wife, 
joseph F. Bourgeois and Joan Bourgeois, 
his wife, and J. Buys Cumming~ and Mary 
Ann (~,mmings, hie wife, formalized and 
placed in writing an agreement thereto-
fore entered into wherein the Appellants 
herein agreed to sign a certain Quit 
Claim D~ed dated April 3, 1958, convey-
ing the property subject heret~ to Nola 
Fletcher and Marion G. Fletcher as joint 
tenants with full rights of survivorship 
and not as tenants in common with the 
understanding that the said Marion G. 
Fletcher and Nola Fletcher would convey 
the same to joseph F. Bourgeois and Joan 
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4 
Bourgeois. Said grantees agreed to re-
tire the lien of the State Welfare De-
partment of the State of Utah and pay 
the costs of the probate. 
The Appellan~ in accordance with the 
terms of said agreement signed said Quit 
Claim Deed and the same was recorded in 
the Wasatch County Recorder's Office on 
January 6, 1959, in Book 34 of Records, 
pages 224-227. 
Nola Fletcher and Marion G. Fletcher 
in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment then Quit Claimed the property to 
Joseph Bourgeois and Joan Bourgeois on 
the 5th day of January, 1959, which deed 
was recorded in the Wasatch County Re-
corder's Office on January 6, 1959, in 
Book 34 of Records, pages 223. 
This Agreement which is Plaintiff's 
Exhibit #5, was recorded in the Wasatch 
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County Recorder's Office on April 27, 
1959, in Book 34 of Records, pages 581-
583. The aboYe mentioned deeds appear 
of record as Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 3 
and 4. 
Nearly four months later joseph 
Bourgeois and joan Bourgeois obtained a 
loan from the Plaintiff-Respondent in 
the amount of Pive Thousand Six Hundred 
Thirty Five Dollars ($5,635.00) and on 
the same date, August 5, 1959, executed 
and delivered to the Respondent a Mort-
gage on the above property as security 
for the payment of the aforesaid ob-
ligation. 
The proceeds of this loan were used 
to pay off the Welfare lien, property 
tL~es, home improvement loan obtained 
by joseph Bourgeois for materials for 
improvement, for recording costs, title 
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insurance to secure the loan, and the 
aforesaid costs of probate with the bal-
ance going to Joe Bourgeois and his wife. 
In accordance with the terms of the 
aforesaid Agreement, joseph Bourgeois 
and joan Bourgeois on November 21, 1961, 
conveyed the aforesaid property by War-
ranty Deed to J. Buys Cummings and his 
wife, which deed was recorded November 27, 
1961, in Book 41 of Records, page 286 of 
the Wasatch County Records. In exchange 
for this Warranty Deed the Appellants 
tendered to the Defendants Joseph Bour-
geois and Joan Bourgeois and the Re-
spondent, Kamas State Bank, the payment 
for the said property in the amount of 
Four Thousand Eighty Dollars ($4,080.00). 
This tender was refused by the Respondent 
and the Mortgage being in default, the 
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Respondent commenced this suit to fore-
close the Mortgage. The Appellants coun-
terclaimed for a decree quieting title as 
against the Respondent. The matter came 
on for pre-trial and during said pre-trial 
Respondent moved the court for Summary 
Judgment. The trial court asked for written 
briefs which were submitted. Upon receipt 
of these briefs the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was granted, the Court stating as 
its grounds that the aforesaid agreement 
constitutes a promissory restraint on 
alienation and is void as against public 
policy. The court then heard evidence on 
the extent of the debt and entered its 
decree of foreclosure. There has been no 
opportunity for the Appellants to present 
evidence concerning the terms or validity 
of said option agreement. The Findings 
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of Fact approved by the Court were non-
disputed facts stipulated to by counsel 
for the aid and benefit of this Court. 
on appeal. All facts in dispute do not 
appear. 
The provision in the agreement in 
question reads as follows: •.l 
"If, at any time, the said Marion G. 
Fletcher, Nola Fletcher, joseph F. 
Bourgeois and joan Bourgeois or any 
of them determine that they shall 
sell said premises, before they shall 
sell them to any other person, they 
hereby agree to permit the said J. 
Buys Cummings and Mary Cummings to 
purchase the same for an amount equal 
to the principal amounts which they 
have paid on the above referred to 
State Welfare Lien, together with 
the value at the time of all per-
manent capital improvements placed 
upon said premises. Parties further 
agree that this right shall constitute 
a lien against said property for and 
during the period of the life of J. 
Buys Cummings, but that upon his de-
cease, such rights shall terminate". 
ARGUMENT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE 
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OPTION AGREEMENT VIOLATES THE RULE 
AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION 
The trial court, in granting the 
Summary Judgment of the Respondent, re-
lied upon the rule set forth in the 
Restatement of Property, Restraints ~ 413 
(2)(a). The comment on~ 413 (2)(a) on 
page 2444 was specifically pointed out. 
The Court found as a matter of law that 
since the terms of the agreement in ques-
tion called for the purchase at a fixed 
price, it violates the rule as therein 
set forth. 
There was no opportunity afforded 
Appellants to submit evidence that would 
fulfill the requirements of the recognized 
exception to said rule as set forth therein. 
It is acknowledged that the Restate-
ment is not necessarily law in Utah, but 
since such reliance was placed thereo~ by 
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the trial court, further development seems 
appropriate. ~ 413 states as follows: 
(1) A promissory restraint or forfei-
ture restraint on the alienation of a 
legal estate in land which is in the form 
of a provision that the owner of the es-
tate shall not sell the same without first 
offering to a designated person the op-
portunity to meet with resonable expedi-
tion, any offer received, is valid, unless 
it violates the rule against perpetuities. 
(2) A promissory restraint or forfei-
ture restraint on the alienation of a 
legal estate in land which is in the form 
of a provision 
(a) that the owner of the estate shall 
not sell the same without first offering 
to sell to some designated person, either 
at a fixed price, or at a percentage of the 
price offered by another person, or 
(b) that the owner of the estate shall 
pay a certain percentage of the sale price 
to some designated person, 
is valid if, and only if, the restraint is 
valid under the rules stated in ~ 406-411. 
The Restatement recognizes as valid 
a restraint that requires the sale at a 
fixed price if it fulfills the rules 
set forth in Restatement of Property, 
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Restraints, ~~ 406-411. 
§ 406 sets forth the rules for 
validity of such restraints as applied 
to indefeasible possessory estates in 
fee simple, to-wit: 
§ 406. Subject to the exception 
stated in s 413(1) (preemptive provision), 
a restraint on the alienation of a legal 
possessory estate in.fee simple which is, 
or but for the restraint would be, inde-
feasible is valid if, and only if, 
(a) the restraint is a promissory 
restraint or a forfeiture restraint, and 
(b) the restraint is qualified so 
as to permit alienation to some though 
not all possible alienees, and 
(c) the restraint is a reasonable 
under the circumstances, and 
(d) if the restraint is a forfei-
ture restraint, the requirements of the 
rule against perpetuities are satisfied. 
Application of the agreement in 
question clearly demonstrates that we 
have at bar a promissory restraint not 
restricted as to possible alienees, and 
s 
that s 406(d) is not applicable. 
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The question remaining under these 
rules is whether or not the restraint is 
reasonable under the circumstances. We 
quote from Comment pages 2406, 2407: 
"· .• The following factors, when 
found to be present, tend to support the 
conclusion that the restraint is reasonable: 
1. the one imposing the restraint has 
some interest in land which he is seeking 
to protect by the enforcement of the re-
straint; 
2. the restraint is limited in dur-
ation; 
3. the enforcement of the restraints 
accomplishes a worthwhile purpose; 
4. the type of conveyances prohibited 
are ones not likely to be employed to any 
substantial degree by the one restrained; 
5. the number of persons to whom 
alienation is prohibited is small (see 
Comments j and k); 
6. the one upon whom the restraint 
is imposed is a charity. 
The following factors, when found to be 
present, tend to support the conclusion that 
the restraint is unreasonable: 
1. the restraint is capricious; 
2. The restraint is imposed for spite 
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or malice; 
3. the one imposing the restraint 
has no interest in land that is benefited 
by the enforcement of the restraint; 
4. the restraint is unlimited in 
duration; 
5. the number of persons to whom 
·alienation is prohibited is large (see 
Comments j and k). 
Applying this to the case at bar, 
Appellants if given an opportunity to 
present evidence will prove: 
A. That Appellants are attempting to 
protect their inheritance from the estates 
of Joseph W. Cummings and Mary Ann Cum-
mings, the consideration given for said 
option. 
B. That the option does not last 
beyond the life of J. Buys Cummings and 
that at the time of the execution of said 
agreement the said J. Buys Cummings was 
an elderly man. 
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C. That in addition to the pro-
tection of said inheritance aforeaaid, 
the purpose of the agree•ent waa to assist 
the indigent grantees. The evidence will 
show that at the time of the execution of 
said agreement, joe Bourgeois and his 
faaily were destitute and that they lacked 
the mini•um necessities of life, including 
a roof over their head. The arrangement 
worked out aade it po8eible to obtain a 
home at a cost fer below the market value 
of the property. It was feared by the 
heirs that should joe Bourgeois be per-
mitted to dispose of this property, either 
volintarily or involintarily, then before 
very long his dependants would again be 
out of a home. The Appellants contem-
plated that so long as said property was 
employed as a home for the family of this 
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man, they would forego realization of 
their inheritance. Subeequent facts 
tend to ahow that the fears of these 
heirs were not unfounded. 
D. There is no restriction affecting 
the number of persons who may purchase 
said property except as exiats with any 
valid option. 
B. That the type of conveyance is 
in no way limited. 
P. That the restraint is in no way 
capricious or imposed for spite or malice. 
A definite purchase price or the mode of 
determining purchase price are accepted 
requirements for the validity of such 
agreements. See Annotation at 117 ALR 
1095. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL OOURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING 
APPELLANTS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OP A PO'l'1N-
TIAL FRAUDULENT C(}JVEYANCE OP SAID PROPERTY 
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BY THE MORTGAGE TO RESPONDENT 
The court had before it evidence 
that the purchase price was Four Thousand 
Eighty Dollars ($4,080.00) under the 
agreement and evidence that the market 
value of said property was much more. Facts 
before the court make it clear that Joe 
Bourgeois, Joan Bourgeois and the Respon-
dent were fully aware of the divergence 
between the option price and market price. 
The Findings of Fact #10 leaves little 
doubt that the Respondent was aware of 
the purchase price because it handled the 
payout of the sums constituting the pur-
chase price under said agreement. The 
Appellants submitted proof (affidavit of 
John L. Chid~ster) that not only did Re-
spondent have constructive knowledge of 
said option, but also had actual knowledge 
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thet eof. 
Appellants should be given an oppor-
tunity to present evidence that may show 
that the Reepondent was participating in 
a fraud designed to get around the option 
agreement and thereby defeat the interest 
of the Appellants. 
ARGlJM.mT I I I 
TilE RESPCJtlDPNT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO 
ATIACK THE TRANSFER PROM JOE BOURGEOIS AND 
JOAN BOURGEOIS TO J. BUYS CU~INGS AND 
MARY CUMMINGS 
The evidence before the court con-
strued most favorably for the Appellants 
shows that the Appellants entered into 
an agreement feeling that they had a 
binding and valid option. It may also be 
concluded that all parties with out fraud 
or collusion felt they had bound them-
selves to a valid option. The Respondent, 
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after actual notice of said option, made 
no effort to subordinate the interest of 
the Appellants to the mortgage or to de-
termine whether or not the Appellants 
felt they had a binding option. 
There was no effort on the part of 
the Respondent to determine whether or 
not the Appellants were prepared to pur-
chase the property at the time of the 
mortgage. There was no notice given 
Appellants of the loan. 
The parties to said agreement in no 
way contest the terms or the validity of 
said option agreement. There has been no 
evidence presented by Respondent of a 
fraudulent conveyance. The prevailing 
rule is set forth in 24 Am. Jur., Fraud-
ulent Conveyances ~ 145, to-wit: 
" 
creditors who have contracted 
debts under such circumstances that know-
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ledge of previous voluntary transfers 
must be imputed to them cannot be re-
garded as hindered, delayed or defrauded 
by such transfers, and therefore, they 
may not attack such conveyances for the 
ourpose of obtaining collection of their 
debts." 
The Respondent was aware of the 
equitable interest in the Appellants and 
aware that it may ripen into full legal 
title. It would appear that Respondent 
would thus not be in a position to con-
test the transfer for the collection of 
this debt. 
Such option agreements are recognized 
as valid in Utah. Cummings et ux. vs. 
Nielson et al., 42 Utah 157. They are 
also protected as any other interest in 
real property by the Recording Act, Knight 
vs. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 2d 394, 315 P2d 
273. 
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Por a general treatment of intervening 
salea or ~ortgages that conflict with a 
prior recorded option see 50 ALP 1315 
(1) Interv~ing Sale or Mortgage. 
ARGUM.EN'l' IV 
RESPONDENT IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT WITH 
CLFAN HANDS 
The Respondent is before the court 
attempting to set aside the option agree-
ment under the following circemstances. 
A. It relies upon a legal technicality 
to attempt to defeat the interest of 
Appellants. 
B. lt hfld actn.al k1owJei1ge of the 
in t e r e s t of A r ~, e 11 a.n t s . 
G . 1 t f a i 1 e d to ma k e any effort to 
determine whet;1,?r or no*" the parties felt 
bound by the terms of s~id option. 
D. It determined to attempt to de-
feat sairt inte~est of Appellants on said 
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legal technicality. 
E. Had it made any effort to inquire 
it could have determined that the parties 
to said agreement felt they had intered 
into a valid option. 
F. It seeks merely to protect the title 
insurance company, the agent of whom de-
termined that they would take the risk (see 
affidavit of John L. Chidester) in making . 
said loan. 
AAG~mTV 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT 
HAD BEFORE IT DISPUTED FACTS CONSTITUTING 
A VALID DEFENSE IF TRUE. 
The affidavit of John L. Chidester 
presen~s sufficient evidence to raise 
the issue of a fraudulent conveyance. 
The stipulated Findings of Fact, to-
gether with the terms of the agreement are 
sufficient to raise the issue of whether or 
not the option agreement is valid under the 
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tests set out in the Restatement, supra. 
The aforementioned affidavit pre-
sents sufficient evidence to raise the 
issue of the Respondents standing to 
attempt to set aside the option. 
The requirements of Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Proceedure leave little 
doubt that the granting of a motion for 
Summary Judgment must be based upon the 
undisputed facts and that if any material 
fact is disputed such motion will not lie. 
Disabled American Veterans vs. Hendrixson 
et al., 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P2d 416. In 
the case of Bullock vs. Desert Dodge 
Truck Center, Inc., 11 U2d 1, 354 P2d 559, 
the court stated as follows: 
"A summary judgment must be supported 
by evidence, admission and inferences 
which, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the loser, show that "there 
is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled 
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to~ judgment as a matter of law," such 
showing must preclude all reasonable pos-
sibility that the loser could, if given a 
trial produce evidence which would reason-
ably sustain a judgment in his favor." 
The Respondent failed to produce any 
evidence that would show that the agree-
ment in question does not fulfill the re-
quirements of the Restatement, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court erred in granting the motion 
for summary judgment as there are material 
issues raised upon which the facts are in 
dispute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH & CHIDESTER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
and Defendants 
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